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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
African governments regularly advocate regionalism as a means for facilitating economic 
development, but the record of intergovernmental cooperation to implement regional 
initiatives has been disappointing.  Most explanations for this record are based on a 
simplistic portrayal of the challenges of cooperation.  They imply that if governments 
prefer cooperative outcomes, they will cooperate; conversely, if governments are seen not 
cooperate, they must not have preferred cooperative outcomes.  This thesis uses an 
alternative framework – derived from game-theoretic perspectives on the logic of 
collective action – to show that regional initiatives do not succeed or fail simply because 
of the presence or absence of gains from cooperation.  The strategic self-interests of 
governments are often at odds with the achievement of cooperative outcomes.  The 
inability to overcome resulting problems of collective action explains why many regional 
initiatives fail despite the support of all member governments.  The thesis analyzes 
several different collective-action problems, using four initiatives of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) as case studies – involving trade liberalization, 
financial regulation, infrastructural development, and governance reform.  The aim is not 
just to present a new theoretical perspective on regional cooperation in Africa, but also to 
illuminate the practical challenges that must be addressed if regional initiatives are to 
succeed. 
 
